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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on developing and analyzing a 
model for an aerially deployed real-time targeting sensor 
net to close the current gap that exists between the 
potential technological-doctrinal capability within society 
and that of the military.  It outlines current real-time 
targeting need due to the decomposition of warfare after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and portrays the targeting 
discrepancies in the Global War on Terror. From end-user 
surveys requirements are layed out for a system of systems 
to meet targeting needs.  A feasible solution consisting of 
a system architecture anchored in existing commercial off 
the shelf technology is proposed to meet the discrete 
deliverables necessary to accomplish targeting goals to 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND DATA 
Today’s ever-changing military environment is best 
described by Jackowski (2002).  He explains that military 
missions “are being redefined daily due to rapidly changing 
world situations and the call for fighting in different 
types of conflict...New emerging technologies that are 
revolutionary will be deployed [in the near future] that 
will really change current military operations” (p. 2).  
The literature has acknowledged the fact that 
technologies are continuing to change and evolve, even at 
the present time (Aloul & Aboelaze, 2005; Nekoogar, 2005; 
Suh & Horton, 2004).  Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and high speed 
networks, for example, are now everyday capabilities and 
expectations.  The Internet is also growing with respect to 
its dimensions - networks are evolving from land-based 
facilities to composite network based entities, now called 
net-centric networks (Bowie, Haffa, & Mullins, 2003; 
Jackowski, 2002).  These are comprised of land, air and 
space modules.  In the view of Jackowski (2002), The Net-
centric network:  
...promises to be the most revolutionary 
improvement in network-enabled operations by 
rapidly getting critical information to the right 
individual or organization, thereby significantly 
improving the efficiency and speed of combat 
operations.  In essence, the major areas 
influencing military operations are new 
government directed missions driven by world 
events and rapidly changing enabling 
technologies... (p. 2). 
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Clearly, change is constantly taking place at an 
accelerated rate with regard to military operations to keep 
up with the times and the new technology.  As Jackowski 
(2002) has noted, “all the new technologies must be fully 
integrated into a comprehensive military architecture as 
early as possible” (p. 2) because warfare has changed as 
well.  In order to understand the purpose and objectives of 
the present thesis, it is first necessary to provide an 
overview of warfare changes in terms of decomposition, a 
redefinition of victory in terms of survival and ideology, 
and the current technological-doctrinal gap that currently 
exists. 
 
A. WARFARE DECOMPOSITION (UNBOUND WARFARE) 
After the Cold War world dissolved the Soviet Union in 
the 1990s many expected tranquility to follow.  However, 
the weapons of war remained, and just because the Command 
and Control structure had dissolved from the top down, the 
basic elements did not disappear.  Instead they 
consolidated after decomposing into their component parts.  
In Yugoslavia, the decomposition was called ethnic 
nationalism.  In Rwanda, it was called tribalism.  Like 
droplets of water coagulating around dust particles, forces 
were rebound around their arms.  Why? Because they had the 
option of violence and a new found self-organization to 
achieve their objectives.  They had been born into a 
culture of violence, the fear was not there, they had been 
desensitized to the violence.  These decompositions took 




as Somalia and Afghanistan. “The world now faces a 
particularly virulent array of decomposed forces, bound 
through ideology” (Braden, 2006, p. 61). 
This force decomposition requires an interoperable 
modularization of our forces.  This means that the greater 
forces must be broken down into component parts which can 
be tailored to the basic sensing-output delivery missions. 
Such sensor missions vary from location to location.  In 
environments consisting of dense foliage, for example, 
sensors can be hung in the trees, whereas aerial coverage 
is not feasible. Conversely, desert (which is the current 
operating environment for the majority of US operations) 
does not lend itself to ground sensors; aerial sensor 
operations are optimal.  The entire mission package must be 
tailored to the operation, location, and enemy.  This is 
the essence of a modularly delivered force that is required 
of this new form of unbound, decomposed warfare (Bowie, 
Haffa, & Mullins, 2003). 
Warfare today is intrinsically a joint operation 
because of the decomposition of opposing forces.  However, 
the disadvantage of joint operations is that it combines 
two large ungainly forces into one - multiple bureaucracies 
and/or multiple chains of command (Joint Vision 2020, GPO 
2000).  As seen in the recent special operations intensive 
conflicts of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom jointness often leads to communication and 
coordination issues that can intensify the fog of war and 
ultimate cost lives.  Documents such as Joint Vision 2020 
(GPO, 2000) and Sea Power 21 (Clark, 2002) which shape U.S. 
national military strategy call for the use of unattended 
sensor networks to provide persistent intelligence, 
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surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).  The evolution of 
integrated circuits, wireless communications, and data 
networking makes unattended, wireless sensor networks 
practical for military and law enforcement applications 
(Bach & Fickel, 2004; Chong & Kumar, 2003; Karlof & Wagner, 
2003; Halvardsson & Lindberg, 2004). 
Sensor and shooter are rarely the same platform today.  
The concept of distributed Command and Control (C2) is 
being implemented downwards to the tactical level.  
Platforms are reaching absolute levels of sensor/shooter 
automation while the boundaries between force 
effectiveness’ are blurring as combined arms and joint 
doctrines employ systems of systems.  Technological 
capability continues to accelerate past the 
doctrinal/conceptual boundaries of today’s military, and 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has opened up new fronts 
around the globe and shifted the threat of war from 
nationalistic targets to ideological targets.  There is no 
clear front anymore.  The front is global, and the tactics 
are asymmetric. 
Refinement of distributed targeting is a necessity in 
order to combat current and future threats in the GWOT with 
Joint Forces.  Complex Targeting in a desert environment 
has proven feasible in OIF where visibility is not limited 
by flora.  However as operations continue to expand around 
the globe in the GWOT, American forces will face the 
challenge of diverse opaque environments (OE) where 
extremist ideologies hostile to the United States and 
American interests also reside. 
The GWOT is essentially a war without boundaries or 
fronts (Shreves, 2004).  Forces and weaponry have 
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decomposed into component parts comprised of individual 
persons with personal communications capabilities for a 
direct mesh of information flow between the edges. 
 
B. VICTORY REDEFINED: SURVIVAL AND IDEOLOGY 
Today the country does not face a national threat as 
before.  The previously understood threat has decomposed 
doctrinally and geographically and continues to progress 
into the next phase of warfare (Shreves, 2004).  Just as 
many look back upon military tactics of the civil war as 
obsolete, so too will the current capability of warfare be 
viewed in the one day in the future. 
Group survival today relies upon a group ideological 
replication, not the traditional notion of genealogical 
survival.  Small nations such as Singapore exist and 
produce great capital with very few national resources.  
Land is no longer a necessary goal of conquering nation 
states. Conquering the world’s information real estate is.  
It is the next level of Darwinian survival.  During times 
of tribal life man sought the survival of his individual 
genes.  Once humans began to organize into larger groups 
they fought for group physical survival.  To survive and 
replicate genes in this type of society required land and 
resources. 
In the first world, today’s sense of survival has 
become rooted in the propagation of ideology.  As Shreves 
(2004) has pointed out, “Much has been written recently on 
how terrorism is a tactic and not an enemy” (p. 3) thus 
supporting the view that survival is indeed related to 
ideology.  Historically, ideas have emerged and demanded 
their own survival - Christianity, Islamic fundamentalism, 
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etc. - these sought to replicate across human minds by 
their intrinsic nature.  Today we have reached a societal 
apex satisfying physical needs, and moved onward to 
ideological survival and competition of mutually exclusive 
ideologies.  It is this self replication of mental real 
estate which is the source of today’s conflicts, and in an 
information age, the replication of ideas is rapid and 
competitive.  Historically, ideological replication 
depended on roadways and physical lines of communication.  
Today information flows freely even through the borders of 
the most repressive regime, and the freedom of information 
is one of the fundamental elements that appears to have 
catalyzed the decomposition of warfare and redefined 
victory. 
It is this global flow of ideologies that influences 
everything from the strategic to the tactical level and 
requires a rewrite of doctrine.  Attrition warfare was 
created to fight in the plane of physical survival.  
Guerilla warfare was created to make war on the local 
ideological plane.  A new plane of global information 
warfare must be created to combat the ideological threat 
being faced in today’s society. 
Contrastingly, this warfare is simplified because of 
it’s decomposition of forces; however this requires a 
greater modularity because of variability of battlespaces.  
Physical survival used to be regionally bound by resources 
and countries.  The rules have changed for ideological 
survival.  Individuals now have access to national level 
ideas that formerly required large organizational support 
to propagate.  The individual is now empowered with the 
ability from the tactical level to flow information up to a 
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global audience and achieve strategic goals.  This person 
can now utilize commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology 
to achieve strategic goals, while at the same time, 
utilizing that technology to downlink strategic ideological 
goals and operate independent of national tasking, and 
carrying out the basic principles of exclusive ideological 
replication. 
 
C. TECHNOLOGICAL DOCTRINAL GAP (TDG) 
Technology has moved beyond traditional doctrinal and 
conceptual understanding within the collective military 
mind (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   Illustration of the Technological-Doctrinal Gap 
 
Military doctrine today is based on tried and true 
methods that have been proven, are acceptable, clearly work 
and are cost-effective.  People with corporate knowledge 
get the job done.  For the majority of the military, 
explicit and tacit doctrine favors antiquated methodologies 
and technologies. 
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As a result, there are technological capabilities not 
exploited by our military. Specifically, there is a  
technological-doctrinal gap between potential sensor 
capabilities based upon society’s technological level and 
current conceptual understanding/doctrinal practices 
(Akyildiz, Weilian, Sankarasubramaniam, & Cayirci, 2002; 
Caimu & Raghavendra, 2005; Fraden, 2004).  Given the input 
of a location in either absolute or relative coordinates 
the desired change of state – whether it be weapons action 
or otherwise - can be produced in real-time (given assets 
are within range).  
That reactionary capability has now been achieved. The 
failure is producing the location output given raw 
emissions from a target.  We depend upon too primitive 
detection methods of raw emissions from enemy units.  If a 
target is emitting or reflecting detectable emissions that 
raw data should be converted into a location output that 
can effectively be used to produce a targeting solution for 
weapons action in real-time.  It is important to note that 
there are EMF emissions (subcategorized into reflected and 
emitted) and acoustic emissions, mostly emitted (Aboelaze & 
Aloul, 2005).  
Given the lack of bounding of enemy forces that must 
be detected – now ideologically bound and highly variable – 
this capability must be highly modularized and made to be 
interoperable. In studies and general experiences with the 
military detected what is loosely labeled as the 
technological-doctrinal gap (TDG). This gap, especially 
related to wireless sensor networks (see Pahlavan & 
Krishnamurthy, 2004) is a model for the discrepancy that 
exists.  Figure 2 lists core tasks of special operations. 
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Figure 2.   Special Operations Core Tasks 
 
Notice the lack of a targeting paradigm or 
description.  Instead, targeting is an implied element in 
each of these tasks but not the focus.  Targeting doctrine 
should be developed as a task to supplement each of these 
tasks.  These highlight the TDG in the sense that there is 
a lack of a doctrinal paradigm for focusing real-time 
targeting operations to streamline and bootstrap existing 
tasks. 
The presence of the TDG is concluded from the 
correlation of several technological and doctrinal items 
seen in both civilian and military sectors of our society.  
These are highlighted in Figure 3 which shows an attempt to 
fill the TDG for sensor technology in homeland security. 
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Figure 3.   Attempts to Fill the TDG for Sensor Technology 
in Homeland Security (From: Vent, 2005) 
 
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate a model – 
that is, a system of systems.  This model will be based on 
fundamental concepts to define targeting problems and 
provide support and background for a potential solution to 
sensor deficiencies.  The model will help us determine how 
to overcome these deficiencies through an aerially deployed 
wireless mesh sensor network which acquires targeting data 
through a net of sensors utilizing a surrounding wireless 
cloud as the information medium to pass multi-layered 
target data and sensor feeds through interoperable gateways 
(high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultra high 
frequency (UHF), Link-16, or otherwise) to the shooter(s). 
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Thus, this thesis focuses on a system of systems – top 
level technologies, doctrines, and tactical concepts 
required for the development of special operations 
forces(SOF)/air power mission accomplishment.  This system 
of systems purports to use the Coalition Operating Area 
Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) research program 
(see Appendix C) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) as 
a tropical-location test bed for equipment and ideas. 
 
E. RATIONALE 
This thesis was founded on the vision that there is a 
solution to be found to the problems and requirements for 
the GWOT and the rapidly changing nature of warfare within 
the current technological capacity of our society. The 
vision is to solve the issues of this new form of ill-
defined warfare using current techniques, technology, and 
doctrinal capabilities.  Some label the new form of 
asymmetric warfare faced today as unconventional, special, 
or military operations other than war (MOOTW); however, it 
is proposed to fundamentally be decomposed into the 
empirical elements of warfare.  This decomposition was 
catalyzed by the fall of the Soviet Union, which provided 
enhanced capabilities to the decomposed elements which in 
turn were allowed to restructure and reorganize at a grass 
roots level. 
It is this new threat of these decomposed elements 
that this thesis seeks to address.  Through the leveraging 
of untapped societal technological capabilities and the 




forces can effectively leverage prosecution capabilities 
against the enemy as is demanded by the strategic 
objectives of the United States. 
To highlight the ideas embodied in this work, an 
analysis of the current GWOT operations needs to take place 
in terms of desert environment versus triple canopy 
targeting.  In Iraq the environment is essentially 
transparent to visual, infrared (IR), and near IR 
wavelength classes of sensors.  However, in OE situations 
where targets cannot be sensed by direct reflections or 
emissions, issues arise with targeting operations.  Urban 
operations are declared bloody casualty rich operations 
because of the opaque nature of the urban environment which 
allows decomposed enemy units to ensnare the military 
within their lower capability level of the sensor-shooter 
cycle highlighting US military sensor deficiencies. 
In the opaque environment (OE) of Vietnam this was 
consistently the case.  American forces retained weapon 
superiority throughout the war, but relied on the basic 
visual or acoustic contacts of foot patrols to output 
targeting data to shooters and prosecute the target.  
Often, sensor and shooter became the same unit, placing 
human life on the line as the sensors to gather targeting 
data.  Today in the global environment produced by free 
information flow, this life losing deficiency in sensor 
capability is not acceptable. 
 
F. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this investigative thesis is to 
provide a proposed model, or system of systems based upon 
currently feasible technologies and the conceptual 
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doctrines/capabilities to augment the solution.  To combat 
this new form of decomposed warfare a flexible and modular 
targeting system need be employed to detect the empirical 
units of war and produce outputs that can be utilized to 
leverage superior weapons capabilities. 
In proposing a paradigm to further enhance strategic 
development of warfare for the United States, this proposed 
system will incorporate a system for rapid deployment.  
This insinuates an aerial delivery system not unlike that 
of the sonobuoy acoustic sensor system or the CBU-97/CBU-
105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).  In addition, to cover the 
wide areas in OE’s the sensor net will need to autonomously 
share and fuse multiple data feeds into a coherent real-
time common operational picture (COP) to complete two 
tasks: (1) provide the knowledge necessary  for situational 
awareness (SA) and target discrimination and (2) output the 
data for target prosecution by the shooter(s). 
In summary, this thesis is an independently tasked 
contribution to the strategic objectives of the United 
States of America.  Its supreme objective is to contribute 
to the next paradigm of warfare principles and meaningful 
progress towards the strategic objectives of the United 
States. 
Based on the objectives stated above, the following 
research questions have been identified: 
1. What are the underlying causes of current 
targeting problems? 
2. What are the empirical causes of these problems? 
3. What is a model for a solution to these problems? 
4. Can a solution be feasibly accomplished with 
currently available technological-doctrinal 
capabilities? 
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G. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Several common terms listed below are uniquely used in 
the study: 
1. Battlespace: Dawidowicz (2001) defines this term as 
“the topology of the physical space where the action is 
taking place, the physical laws, the involved equipment and 
the entities' physical attributes” (p. 1). 
2. Net-Centric: This designation refers to any entity 
or service that centers around the Internet and involves 
some type of computing system.  A net-centric approach 
refers to the method used by a community of interest 
(agency, group, division, unit, etc.) brought together 
through a social network that aligns itself with Internet 
and computerized metadata.  According to Zenishek and 
Usechak (2002), “a net-centric enterprise [whatever the 
form] must be implemented using open standards, non-
proprietary APIs, loose coupling between data and 
applications, and agile (i.e., not fragile) interfaces” (p. 
218). 
3. Measures of Effectiveness and Performance: Measures 
of effectiveness (MOE) refers to a qualitative description 
of the desired parameters of the system (e.g. “the system 
will identify if the target is carrying a weapon”).  A 
listing of these can be found in Appendix A at the end of 
the thesis.  Measures of Performance (MOP) refer to a 
quantitative definition of the desired capabilities of the 




4. Small Sensor – Small Shooter: It is best to have a 
small sensor footprint.  Today’s global situation demands 
surgically striking without getting shot.  Striving to 
achieve this is an ideal, but not often realistic. 
5. Real-Time Targeting: Rather this thesis focuses on 
the current realized need for the accurate, high-tempo, and 
real-time targeting of high value targets.  However, the 
fundamentals proposed can be rescaled to analyze larger 
targeting missions. 
6. Technological-Doctrinal Gap: This refers to a lack 
of doctrinal understanding for focusing real-time targeting 
operations to streamline and bootstrap existing tasking. 
 
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I introduces the study. It explains the topic, 
background of the problem, and the purpose of the study. It 
also redefines the meaning of victory and describes warfare 
decomposition. It addition, it provides research questions 
and definitions of terms that are unique to the study.  
Chapter II details the methodology of the research 
study. Included is an explanation of the thesis structure, 
approach and method, assumptions, and limitations. 
Chapter III reviews the pertinent technology 
literature. It details technology reports, sensor studies, 
fundamentals of warfare and network centric warfare.  
Chapter IV provides a suggested model for real-time 
targeting – that is, a system of systems through an 
aerially deployed wireless mesh sensor network 
conceptualized from support in professional literature and 
research experiences. 
16 
Chapter V concludes the study.  It brings together the 
separate modular components into a unified whole.  It 




A. TOP DOWN APPROACH 
This thesis was written with a top down approach as 
shown in Figure 4.  Need and problems are defined first 
followed by paradigm development, refinement, and 
solutions.  First and foremost, need is identified.  
Second, requirements are defined through an end-user 
perspective derived from operators and refined into 
measures of effectiveness and performance 
It is important to note that this thesis and the 
resulting model were developed through an evolutionary 
process.  Techniques were developed, evaluated, and 
accepted or discarded based upon anticipated effectiveness.  
The methodology evolved with the writing of the thesis to 
optimally transfer information to the reader taking full 
advantage of the benefits of transferring information 
visually through figures and diagrams. 
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Figure 4.   Top-Down Development Process 
 
B. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The present study represents qualitative research in 
that information is collected from researcher experiences, 
findings from the literature review, and conclusions were 
made from supporting experiences.  In qualitative research, 
according to Creswell (2003), the researcher must ensure 
that the data collected is an accurate representation of 
the subject being studied, is comparable with known 
information, and is verifiable across subjects and 
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situations.  This is necessary with qualitative research 
because this type of investigation emphasizes the 
uniqueness of human situations and experiences that are not 
necessarily accessible to validation through traditional 
(quantitative) forms of empirical evidence (Creswell, 
2003).  In light of this restriction, the quantitative 
terms reliability and validity are replaced with more 
qualitative terms, dependability and credibility.  The 
research approach and method of the study draws on past and 
current studies, reports, and related material in addition 
to researcher experience.  Experience data was supported by 
findings from authoritative studies, when possible. 
The methodology of the present investigative research 
focused on developing concepts leading to the suggestion of 
a model – that is, a system of systems.  Thus, the research 
method was divided into phases.  These are described as 
follows. 
1. Phase 1: Problem Definition 
Phase 1 involves the provision of basic definitions of 
current global requirements for complex targeting based 
upon geo-political climate/geographical concerns. Current 
problem of complex targeting must first be defined and a 
thorough statement of need developed. From the problem 
definition and the statement of need requirements are 
developed. 
2. Phase 2: Complex Targeting Research 
This phase involves research of current techniques, 
technologies, and doctrine for complex targeting. This 
phase includes the necessary academic review of existing 
technical material, techniques, and doctrine utilized in 
complex targeting in both triple canopy rainforest and 
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other environments.  The academic review will include 
verbal interviews of end-users.  The review will take an 
end-user, top down view to development a comprehensive 
needs statement.  Shortfalls in the linkage of doctrine to 
technology will be discussed and examined. 
3. Phase 3: Concept (Model) Analysis 
Once thorough research of current technologies, 
doctrine, training, and current operations/cases has been 
completed, an encompassing conceptual model is developed – 
one that employs appropriate technologies, training, and 
personnel to accomplish the well defined complex targeting 
mission.  During the development of the concept MOE’s will 
be created to objectively evaluate future results. 
4. Phase 4: Conclusions and Future Development 
The final phase consists of analyzing the system 
requirements and MOE’s to develop a proposed system 
architecture and a legitimate path for future systems 
development 
. 
C. COASTS FIELD EXPERIMENTATION 
The concept underlying the COASTS program emulates a 
very successful ongoing NPS-driven field experimentation 
program entitled the NPS-U.S Special Operations Command 
Field Experimentation Program (NPSSOCFEP) (see Appendix C).  
This program has been active and successful since 2002 
(COASTS Thailand Field Experiment, 2006).  Right from the 
start this program supported USSOCOM requirements for 
integrating emerging wireless local area network 
technologies with surveillance and targeting 
hardware/software systems.  The purpose was to augment SOF 
missions.  
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Since its inception, NPSSOCFEP has significantly 
grown.  Today it includes almost a dozen private sector 
companies, several Department of Defense (DoD) 
organizations, and various academic institutions that 
contribute resources.  An important activity of NPSSOCFEP 
is to conduct quarterly complex experiments to: 
• Provide an opportunity for NPS students/faculty 
to experiment/evaluate the latest technologies 
which have potential near-term application to the 
warfighter.  
• Provide operational experience to 
students/faculty.  
• Provide military, national laboratories, 
contractors, and universities an opportunity to 
test and evaluate new technologies in operational 
environments; and implement self-forming multi-
path, ad-hoc network w/sensor cell, ground, air, 
and satellite communications (SATCOM) network 
components. 
COASTS 2005 used wireless local area network 
technologies to bring together data from ground and air 
sensors to a real-time, tactical C2 center.  The successful 
display of capability clearly indicated United States 
Pacific Command dedication to encourage technology 
development and coalition warfare.  Results of the 
experiment were shared with such countries as South Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and South Korea (COASTS 
Thailand Field Experiment, 2006). 
COASTS 2006 will expand on the previous experiment and 
integrate the technology capability into a larger system of 
systems in support of tactical action scenarios in the form 
of an air, ground, and water-based scenario north of Chiang 
Mai, Thailand.  Collection of tactical information will be 
displayed and distributed in real-time centers. This fusion 
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of information will authenticate the use of wireless 
communication mediums and test and evaluate the ‘last mile’ 
solution for the disadvantaged user. 
It is important to explain that COASTS is a small unit 
network-capable communication and threat warning system 
that uses an open, plug-and-play architecture.  This type 
of structure can be customized – that is, configured by the 
user. 
Building self-configurable systems is most desirable, 
according to Subramanian and Katz (2000).  It is possible 
to employ wireless ad-hoc networks, SA software 
applications, air balloons, UAVs, and biometrics 
capabilities, among other capabilities.  All included 
components communicate through wireless network technology.  
COASTS 2006 provides a testing and experimental 
setting for both Thailand as well as the United States.  In 
this setting operational testing, field validation of newer 
wireless technologies, and integration can take place.  
A number of research elements were addressed during 
the 2006 experiment.  These include 802.11 b Distributed 
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS); 802.11a/g Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM); 802.16 OFDM 
(Stationary); 802.16 OFDM (Mobile); SATCOM; and SA Overlay 
Software.  In addition, wearable computing devices were 
tested as well as mobile C2 platforms.  Shown in Figures 5 
and 6 are the COASTS 2006 network topology and 
communications network model. 
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Figure 6.   COASTS 2006 Communications Network Model 
 
D. END-USER DEFINED REQUIREMENTS 
Qualitative requirements were derived from End-User 
Interview of Special Forces Personnel with experience 
operating in the Philippines Area of Operations.   This 
area of operations (AO) includes the Triple Canopy OE 
Jungle and Urban Centers where insurgents intermix with 
non-combatants. 
 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Below is a list of assumptions and limitations used 
for this thesis: 
1. There exists a technological doctrinal gap (TDG). 
2. There is a current need for a more proficient 
targeting system. 
3. Combat will mostly be performed below the 
divisional level in the future. 
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4. Sensors are a detectable vulnerability. 
5. With regard to sensor discrepancy, there are 
currently a number of issues associated with 
producing outputs from full spectrum emissions. 
6. This thesis was restricted with regard to scope 
in terms of finances and time. 
7. It is assumed that there can be a scalable 
solution with respect to affordable real-time 
targeting through an aerially deployed wireless 
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III. TECHNOLOGY/LITERATURE REVIEW 
The previous portion of this thesis introduced the 
subject of concern, provided background information, stated 
the purpose, and presented the objectives and research 
questions.  The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
technology literature relevant to the major focus on the 
study.  The new form of warfare is examined first.  The 
subject of technologies and implications is reviewed next, 
followed by a section on sensors. 
 
A. NEW FORM OF WARFARE 
The Counter Insurgency (COIN) Academy in Baghdad has 
been specifically established to address the needs of the 
emerging requirement of victory in the new form of warfare 
(Ricks, 2006).  Being compulsory for all officers to take, 
it requires: 
The School’s textbook, a huge binder, [which] 
offers the example of a mission that busts into a 
house and captures someone who mortared a U.S. 
base. 
On the surface, a raid that captures a known 
insurgent or terrorist may seem like a sure 
victory for the coalition,’ it observes in red 
block letters. It continues, ‘The potential 
second- and third-order effects, however, can 
turn it into a long-term defeat if our actions 
humiliate the family, needlessly destroy 
property, or alienate the local population from 
our goals (Ricks, 2006, p. A10). 
The handbook attempts to address the essential 
underlying cause of tactical victories turning into 
strategic losses.  Information propagation in itself is not  
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inherently a detriment to U.S. forces.  The fidelity of the 
information being spread and the bias lent to that 
information are what cause strategic steps backward.  
It is also important to understand that fragments of 
information can cause more damage than an individual 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) to strategic objectives. 
Data fragments can spread, support, and plant the seed for 
the ideology of hate that tasks the people to conduct such 
operations of terrorism against the Western World. 
Consequently, it is this ideology that must be combated 
with precision operations. 
This emerging requirement for victory requires a high 
level of precision, but not just precise weapons action 
(that capability has already been acquired), but precise 
target detection.  
 
B. TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
The following review focuses on technologies and their 
respective implications. For the sake of brevity, various 
technologies of importance are cited in terms of items 
below, followed by conclusions. 
1. Sensor Nets 
The technology exist and was developed when the need 
was catalyzed by Cold War operations in the past Sonobuoys 
and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) system were 
developed from the threat of nuclear destruction during the 





• Conclusion: Acoustic sensor technology exists. 
• Conclusion: A form of rapidly deployable sensor 
net technology exists 
• Conclusion: Real-time targeting network 
technology and doctrine exists. 
 
 
Figure 7.   SOSUS Acoustic Sensor Network 
 
2. Ultrawideband Sensors 
The technology exists to actively output, sense, 
analyze, and display reflected wideband electromagnetic 
energy.  The raw data can be processed to classify a target 
(Figure 8, 9, 10, and 11). 
• Conclusion: The technology for highly sensitive 
and flexible sensors with the ability to 
automously produce discriminating data exists. 
• Conclusion: The capability for real-time sensor 
feeds layered with target data exists. 
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Figure 8.   Ultra Wideband (UWB) Video Sensor Looking 
through Wall(From: Herzig, 2005) 
 
 








Figure 11.   UWB Sensor Generating a Video Stream from 
Reflected Wavelengths through a Wall (From: 
Herzig). 
 
3. Information Dissemination 
Link-16 and other technologies are currently in use to 
transmit data between platforms and forces (Figure 12) 
(Fenton, 1999). 
• Conclusion: The technology exists for a reliable, 
secure information medium to pass information 
solutions from sensor to shooter. 
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Figure 12.   Illustration of Link-16 Interoperability 
 
4. Wireless Information Security 
NSA approved SecNet 11 technology exists for 802.11 
wireless security at the secret level (see Figure 13). 
• Conclusion: The technology exists to support of 




Figure 13.   SecNet 11 NSA Approved Encryption 
 
5. Aerially Deployed Autonomous Sensor-Shooter Grid 
The CBU-97/CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon is an aerially 
deployed weapon that deploys munitions that hunt with IR 
sensors, hover, and fire munitions into tanks. 
• Conclusion: The ability to aerially deploy and 
maneuver sensors in an optimized grid to 
autonomously search for and destroy tanks exists. 




Figure 14.   CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon 
 
6. Wireless Mesh Communications Nodes 
MeshDynamics has created COTS technology for a self 
contained wireless mesh communications network made from 
numerous self-organizing wireless mesh routing boxes(Figure 
15) (Werner-Allen, Swieskowski, & Welsh, 2005; Turon, 
Horton, Hill, & Broad, 2005). 
• Conclusion: The technology exists for a self-
organizing rapidly deployable hastily formed 




Figure 15.   Mesh Dynamics Wireless Mesh Box 
 
7. Aerially Deployed Environmental Remote Sensors 
Technology deployed aerially which transmits surface 
environmental data to an aircraft for High Altitude High 
Opening (HAHO) and High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) drop 
accuracy exists. 
• Conclusion: Capabilities exist to aerially deploy 
sensors in high tempo operations. 
• Conclusion: Capabilities exist for the 
ruggedization of sensors. 
8. Remote Power Source Technology 
There is COTS technology to remotely deploy solar 
powered remote renewable hydrogen power sources.  These 
power sources can be miniaturized and ruggedized (Figure 
16). 
• Conclusion: There exist resources for a 
sustainable, renewable, and ruggedized remotely 
managed power source. 
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Figure 16.   Gridpoint Remotely Managed Renewable Power 
Source  
 
9. Miniaturized Sensor Webs 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Association 
(NASA) have jointly developed a technology labeled Sensor 
Webs designed as a web of adaptive, self healing, 
miniaturized pods that share environmental information 
(Figure 17 and 18). 
• Conclusion: The technology exists for a web of 
networked, wireless, sustainable, spatially 








Figure 18.   Gumball Size Wireless Sensor Pod 
 
10. Target Data Layered onto a Sensor Feed 
In the British Subway there exists technology to 
overlay ultra wideband (UWB) sensor data onto a video 
stream from a camera to identify those carrying firearms or 
explosives onto the subway. 
• Conclusion: The technology exists to classify 
targets as hostile based on what they are 





11. Networkable Aerial Sensors 
Rotomotion LLC and Cyberdefense Inc. have both 
developed networkable miniature unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV’S) utilizing 802.11 wireless protocol. These are the 
CyberBug and the Rotomotion SR50. This researcher was 
trained to operate both miniature UAV’s while supporting 
the COASTS team in Thailand (Figures 19 and 20). 
• Conclusion: Mobile aerial sensors exist. Although 
the prototypes had technical and operational 
problems, they supported incorporation of mobile 
aerial wireless sensors into the real-time 
targeting sensor loop in order to produce the 
required targeting outputs. 
 
 




Figure 20.   Networked VTOL Mobile Aerial Sensor 
 
12. Static Aerial Sensor and Transmission Nodes 
During COASTS’ development of a tactical sensor net 
tethered balloons were utilized to carry a payload 
including an internet protocol (IP) camera and a 
MeshDynamic’s routing box attached to them as a payload. 
The balloons operated effectively as sensor and 
transmission medium nodes at altitudes up to 4,000 feet 
(see Figure 21 below). 
• Conclusion: It is feasible to utilize COTS 
technology to create an aerial sensor and 
communications set held aloft by a balloon. As an 
information medium this provides extended range 
and could provide a link to additional sensor 
nets or weapons elements. 
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Figure 21.   Visual Sensor and Information Node 
 
13. Summary 
From these examples it is reasonable to conclude that 
sensor technology and doctrine is in fact gapped far behind 
the potential capabilities to satisfy current operational 
needs. 
 
C. SENSOR REVIEW  
1. Ultra-Wideband Sensors 
According to Herzig (2005) in his analysis of the 
ultra wideband (UWB) and mesh network technology in the 
feasibility of UWB sensors for tactical operations, UWB can 
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operate effectively as a security fence.  It can establish 
a stationary radio frequency perimeter.  In addition, due 
to its wide frequency spectrum and the different ways 
unique frequencies reflect off of different materials, the 
UWB sensor system has the ability to discriminate between 
materials to the resolution of telling a man from a deer, 
or the location of a firearm on a man’s body (Cravotta, 
2002; Intel, 2004; Nekoogar, 2005).  
Herzig’s (2005) work characterizes the UWB sensors in 
work by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) as 
covert.  Their signal is difficult to detect since it falls 
below the typical noise threshold at most distances and has 
a low probability of intercept (LPI).  The pulse-repetition 
frequency (PRF) is random, mimicking white-noise (Figure 
22). 
UWB signals act as a reflecting form of radar.  In 
addition they can be used to encode the information 
necessary for communications and this is another positive 
attribute for sensor nodes that must communicate, self 
organize, and finally output information to the weapons 
actor (Figure 23). 
 
Figure 22.   Signal Comparison against Noise Threshold 
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Figure 23.   Full Duplex Handheld UWB Transceiver 
 
In addition, UWB technology can be used for effective 
geolocation (Figure 24) where coordinates can not be 
derived from the Global Positioning System (GPS) such as in 
thick forests or man made structures (Rabaey, Ammer, da 
Silva, Patel, & Roundy, 2000; Wilson, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 24.   UWB Precision Geolocation System Transceiver 
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Herzig (2005) also concluded that UWB was the ideal 
medium for the physical layer of network operations.  
Coupled with the capability to detect, classify, and output 
targeting data, UWB provides a multi-use technology that 
could simplify sensor operations while combining the sensor 
and the transmission medium into the same node (Callaway, 
2004; He, Stankovic, Lu, & Abdelzaher, 2003). 
These capabilities combined with LLNL developed UWB 
technology for military applications makes it the leading 
candidate sensor for full spectrum coverage of target 
reflections (Herzig 2005).  The capabilities of UWB allow 
for autonomous characterization of targets (Cravotta, 
2002). 
In addition, LLNL is currently researching and 
producing a device titled the “Guardian Sensor” which is an 
UWB device also that also acts as a sensor fence. 
2. Visual Feed Sensors 
According to a recent report by Innovative Wireless 
Technologies (2006), improved communications and awareness 
of one’s situation are vital components to reaching current 
military objectives both at home and overseas. “A key 
aspect...is sensor networks. These sensors, with ad-hoc 
networking capability, could provide an early-threat 
detection that is rapidly deployable, failsafe and 
inexpensive” (p. 1). 
Visual sensors or sensors that can produce a visual 
output from emissions or reflections (IR, near IR, UWB, or 
even acoustic) are also essential in a sensor net that will 
create a real time sensor-loop for command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR)  (DeBardelaben, 2003; Fraden, 2004).    
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to review literature 
pertinent to the study.  The first section described the 
new form of warfare.  It was explained that victory has 
been redefined as the spread of the correct ideology to 
prevent the tasking of the attack on the U.S. or her 
interests by individuals capable of it. 
Technologies and sensors were reviewed next.  The 
review included discussion on ultra-wideband and visual 
sensors.  The following portion of the review focused on 
problems with research. COASTS and Thailand problems were 
detailed, followed by an examination of general real-time 
targeting issues. Included were discussions of small 
shooter-small sensor, COASTS deployment, and sensor net 
operations. 
Chapters I and II of this thesis have now laid the 
groundwork for the study and its attendant objectives.  The 
following chapters will now define the problem and develop 
a model for the solution. 
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IV. MODEL ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the model 
recommended for resolving the TDG problem.  Before this can 
be achieved, however, it is first necessary to explain need 
and define requirements.  Following that will be a 
description of solutions and the model architecture. 
 
A. NEED 
The need for real-time targeting solutions in the 
uncontrolled OE regions of Thailand is representative of 
the global need the U.S. must meet in the GWOT. 
1. Need in Thailand 
The need for successful operations in Thailand has 
never been greater.  Asymmetric threats to the national 
security of America continue to increase (Parr, 2003).  
These include narcotics smuggling, piracy, human 
trafficking, and terrorism, among other similar activities 
(Parr, 2003).  Globalization of these types of activities 
continues to redirect American attention away from her own 
borders.  In addition, the separatist insurgency in the 
southern provinces has been linked to various terrorist 
organizations that operate internationally and have been a 
serious threat to not just Thailand, but to the United 
States and its allies as well (Roberts, Trace, & Klein, 
2004).  
Unfortunately, current tactical systems are not able 
to rapidly deploy a common information environment among 
air and land entities.  An autonomous network cannot be 
generated.  While some technologies exist that could assist  
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in this endeavor, these typically do not meet the stringent 
DoD and coalition partner requirements for the GWOT and 
other security missions.  
Security issues now command the fullest attention.  
These are being addressed on many different levels.  For 
example, Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is 
initiating data/intelligence fusion centers in Chiang Mai, 
Thailand.  Such a data center focuses on collecting 
intelligence for many different types of operations.  In 
addition, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) 
is focusing on coastal areas involving transnational open 
ocean counter-piracy and counter-terrorism.  
These entities are now meshing their activities with 
American efforts in a coalition-oriented effort to decrease 
the ever-growing problems associated with illegal drug 
activities and human trafficking (Roberts et al., 2004).  
The growth of such problems was recently reported by the 
Bangkok Post (03 January 2006) as follows:  
The [Thai] Narcotics Control Board forecasts a 
continuing rise in the number of drug-related 
cases this year, but expects the overall amount 
of methamphetamine in circulation to decline. 
Secretary-general Krissana Polanant said the 
trend is for traffickers to carry smaller 
quantities of pills which means the smugglers 
will have to make more trips which increases the 
chances of them being arrested. Provinces on the 
bureau’s close-watch list are Chiang Rai, Chiang 
Mai, Tak, Nan, Nakhon Sawan, Nonthaburi, Sing 
Buri, Ayutthaya, Nakhon Pathom and Bangkok.  
2. Perceived Thai Problem 
According to a recent report (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2005), Thailand has an extended border with Burma 
that requires military assets to patrol for the purpose of 
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battling drug smugglers and human traffickers.  The 
military provides monitoring, surveillance, and targeting.  
The illicit drug smuggling and trafficking in human cargo 
has significantly increased in recent years and has become 
a significant problem, especially in light of the fact that 
these illicit operations can provide financial support for  
international terrorist organizations.  The problem is 
further increased when note is taken that many of the 
illegal drugs reach the United States through shipments 
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits.  It 
is the responsibility of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) 3rd Army 
to maintain ground–based security and surveillance.  
Other security problems are currently occurring which 
demand Thai military attention in the southern regions of 
Thailand.  In fact, the RTA 4th  Army has been deployed to 
this region to deescalate tensions caused by insurgency and 
unrest.  
In addition, small boat activity in the Gulf of 
Thailand has escalated.  The purpose of this activity is to 
illegally distribute weapons and ammunition.  All these 
problems and insurgencies have financially impacted the 
Thailand government and taken their toll on the country’s 
military forces.  Clearly, more capable ISR will enable 
Thailand to reduce asymmetric attacks against civilian and 
military targets. 
3. COASTS Scenario Overview  
The COASTS research team executed a drug interdiction 
scenario (see Appendix C for details on the COASTS concept 
of operations) in direct support of the following nine 
principal mission areas. These are briefly described as 
follows (COASTS Thailand Field Experiment, 2006):  
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1. Direct Action (DA): During short-duration, high-
tempo offensive missions, the primary function of COASTS is 
to provide force protection that requires little or no 
operator interface.  COASTS also will provide automated 
reporting to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for 
potential threats relevant to a specific mission.  
2. Tactical Reconnaissance (TR): The purpose of a TR 
mission is to collect data.  COASTS will augment other 
capabilities to obtain/verify information and will support 
a range of information and communication functions.  
3. Foreign Internal Defense (FID): COASTS assists Host 
Nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces, with the goal 
to enable forces to maintain the HN’s internal stability.  
4. Combating Terrorism (CBT): COASTS will support CBT 
activities to include anti-terrorism (defensive measures 
taken to reduce vulnerability) and counterterrorism 
(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond).  
5. Civil Affairs (CA): COASTS assists in peacetime to 
preclude grievances from flaring into war and during 
hostilities to help ensure that civilians do not interfere 
with operations and that they are protected.  
6. Counter-proliferation Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD): COASTS assists traditional capabilities to seize, 
capture, destroy, render safe, or recover WMD.  COASTS also 
provides data to assist U.S. military forces and coalition 
partners to operate against threats.  
7. Information/Counter-Narcotic Operations: COASTS 
augments actions and applies information across all phases 
of an operation and the spectrum of military operations.  
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Counter-narcotic operations augment JIATF-W, U.S. Embassy 
Bangkok, and Thai law enforcement efforts to reduce the 
level of transnational narcotic smuggling.  
8. Maritime Security and Interdiction Operation: 
COASTS uses C4ISR capability for small boats capable of 
conducting maritime terrorism exclusion operations.  The 
modular usage of fly away kit (FLAK) technology makes small 
boat interdictions ISR-mission capable.  Visit, board, 
search, and seizure (VBSS) operations are conducted by all 
U.S. and coalition forces.  
9. Psychological Operations (PSYOP): As a vital IO 
tool in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism 
operations, the COASTS research program analyzes the 
ability of the wireless network to be utilized for PSYOP 
missions in the tactical environment.  
4. COASTS Scenario Overview 
The scenario decomposed the force into its component 
parts and highlights the redefinition of the component 
parts of military actions. It should be noted that three 
fundamental classes exist in this object orientated 
operation. These include: sensor, information input/output, 
and the weapons action. 
Illustrated below in Figure 25 is a visual 
representation of the scenario. 
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Figure 25.   Event Breakdown for the Mae Gnat Dam Drug 
Interdiction Scenario 
 
During the above functional decomposition of a real-
time targeting force, three broad classes of action were 
developed:  
1. Sensor Operations: for identification, 
classification, and location of target(s);  
2. Information Transfer: for transfer of above 
processed information through the information 
medium. 
3. Weapons Action: takedown or destruction of 
identified targets—this doctrine has been 
developed and well refined through military 
history. 
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The Weapons Action portion of the operation is ready 
to receive inputs from targeting.  However there is little 
doctrine for iterative real-time targeting. 
 
B. REAL-TIME TARGETING PARADIGM PROBLEM 
Special forces (SF) end-users when regarding targeting 
operations assumed that a paradigm existed for real-time 
targeting.  What was found, however, was that in reality 
very little of the real-time targeting paradigm existed in 
the collective consciousness of the Special Forces.  
Instead, personnel were focused on targeting as a non real-
time process.  Little or no focus was paid to enhancing 
capability.  Instead, it was insinuated that the sensory 
operations for most missions followed naturally from the 
doctrine sensor information came from visual human ground 
sensors, visual human aerial sensors, etc.  Data would be 
passed over a voice net between sensor and shooter and 
often the sensor was the shooter.  The enhancement and 
separation of the sensor element was not regarded as a 
principle of warfare. 
 
C. SENSORS 
1. Small Shooter-Small Sensor 
Today’s sensors have too much footprint. But there is 
almost no footprint for shooters up at 30,000 feet against 
GWOT enemies.  Clearly, sensor operations require 
improvement.  How should this be fixed?  Doctrine and 
sensor technology for past conflicts with a larger level of 
bounded combat exists.  Previous doctrine required the 
forces to be bounded in geography, communications,  
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movements, and tactics.  Such bounding of forces is an 
assumption of a previous form of warfare that no longer 
holds true. 
As previously noted, victory has been redefined by the 
enemy.  No longer is it a national victory; rather, it is 
ideological.  Because of the nature of the forces — that 
is, independently operating cells — and the nature of their 
goals (political) the American military force faces a 
changing combat paradigm.  Because the luxury of detecting 
division level forces no longer exists, shooters have been 
adjusted appropriately.  However, the sensors continue to 
struggle.  A current solution for this lagging sensor 
technology is often heard in the common rhetoric of “boots 
on the ground.”  In other words, people need to be sent in 
to walk around and visually identify targets and produce 
from that visual identification a location—relative or 
absolute—and then follow with the necessary operations to 
prosecute targets at that location.  Consequently, the 
sensors (humans in this case) that are employed are limited 
conceptually, technologically, and doctrinally.  
Because of these changing requirements and assumptions 
the principles of warfare have shifted from what they once 
were.  There is little focus upon where to direct combat 
power and little focus on sensor necessity.  Figure 26 
highlights the currently recognized principles of war.  
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Figure 26.   Current Recognized Principles of War 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the real-time sensor cycle1, 
today’s technology has enabled the medium that binds the 
shooter to the sensor. Bootstrapping has focused the 
majority of concern on the shooter because in the past the 
opposing forces have not been difficult to detect - at 
least not with the level of technology that existed at the 
time.  Thus, sensors have been shooters. 
                     1 See Lim (2001) for information dissemination in self-organizing 
real-time sensor networks. 
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Figure 27.   The Real-Time Sensor Cycle 
 
As can be seen in the Figure 28, the task of targeting 
is not focused upon in the current Joint Architecture for 
joint special operations task force elements.  Architecture 
is not broken down along functional lines; instead it is 
broken down into traditional task oriented components.  The 
proposed real-time targeting architecture suggested in this 
thesis is broken down into elements that are functionally 
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separated into sensor, information processing, 
dissemination, and prosecution elements.  These elements 




Figure 28.   Special Operations Liaison Element Functions 
(From: JSOTF Pub) 
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2. Sensor Net Operations 
The C4ISR operators require several objects layered 
with the sensor feed to utilize it for situational 
awareness (SA).  The first is visually represented 
positional data, most likely a map or an overhead image 
with an updating overlay of the field of view (FOV) (Figure 
29).  The second is simplified target classification data 
layered onto the feed(s).  Target classification, for 
example, could include an overlay onto the real time feed 
identifying the target with a rendered box (Figure 30).  
The target can then be identified on the feed and mapped to 
the common operational picture.  Otherwise, in a congested 
local area of operations, the target will be lost in the 
noise. 
 
Figure 29.   Common Operational Picture Displaying UAV 
Sensor Feed FOVs, TDD, and Friendly Overlay 
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In addition, sensor feed overlays should take 
advantage of UWB capabilities by indicating hostile 
equipment or contraband (improvised explosive devices 
(IED’s), firearms, etc.) on persons or targets.  Finally, 
not included in the feed, but in the feed interface, there 
must be some way of identifying and accessing multiple 
feeds for the operator. There must be a portal interface 
that prioritizes which feeds provide the most targeting 
information on the COP. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Aerial Sensor Feed Overlayed with TDD, Friendly 
Data, and Sensor Feed Priority 
 
In experiences with UAV operations and sensor net 
operations, it was found that SA was not generated 
adequately from a raw visual feed (Yan & Tsa, 2005). 
Instead, the feed required SA augmentation.  This 
augmentation takes the form of an overhead or map display 
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with the FOV rendered on it in real-time.  This gives the 
client of the sensor net adequate SA to transform a raw 
feed into actionable knowledge. 
In precision guided bomb procedures the process is 
similar with the airborne operator guiding in the bomb 
based on a visual reference produced from SA, from a map or 
a visual look.  In addition RQ-1 Predator drones utilize 
this exact FOV mapping method, calculating the location of 
the FOV from laser range data. 
In experiences with airborne visual sensor feeds 
(CyberDefense’s Cyberbug, Rotomotion vertical takeoff and 
landing (VTOL) UAV’s) without an accompanying geographical 
orientation rendered, it was difficult to identify the 
location of practice targets.  To gain the SA required, 
frequent camera orientation to the front of the aircraft 
(swiveling it up to a forward looking view) and correlating 
it with the direction of flight displayed on the map the 
ground control station displayed for navigation purposes 
(Figure 31) was required.  If the sensor is providing an SA 
feed, the process needs to be appropriately formalized for 
mobile airborne sensor operations. 
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Figure 31.   CyberDefense CyberBug Gimbaled Visual Sensor 
Feed 
 
D. END-USER SURVEY 
1. Problem Definition 
The largest problems for operators attempting to 
prosecute targets within OE’s are: (1) target 
discrimination between the non-combatants and enemy targets 
and (2) opaque barriers obscuring targets such as the 
jungle environment foliage or man made structures.   This 
is because insurgents are often embedded within the local 
populace.  The main problem is the variation of 
environmental opacity obscuring sensor capability in 
addition to the discrimination of actual targets and non-
combatants.   The margin for error is small making this a 
difficult problem.  Within such OE’s where Joint forces are 
operating, the fog of war becomes an issue with friendly SA 
causing fratricide.  
2. Discrete Deliverables 
There are several discrete deliverables required from 
sensor operations to input into weapons operations as 
defined by the end-user survey.  These are: 
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• Highly accurate grid coordinates in Military Grid 
Reference System (MGRS) format (most sensor 
systems deliver a general location of sighted 
warm bodies which is often not sufficient for 
targeting) 
• SA feeds augmented with grid coordinates 
• Information on whether targets are armed or 
unarmed 
• Accurate numbers of personnel 
• Queuing of targets in prioritized by threat 
• Proper fusion of the sensor data 
• Generation of an accurate, COP 
• Secure and reliable transmission of the COP 
3. Ideal Equipment Requirements 
On the tactical level ground sensors that can provide 
real-time sensor feeds equivalent to that of Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) or equivalent to that of an RQ-11 
Raven UAV (Figure 32). 
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Figure 32.   RQ-11 Raven Squad Level UAV 
 
On the operational level a wide area of coverage must 
be kept within an SA feed to provide operators with the SA 
of their larger operational surroundings equivalent to that 
of a RQ-1 Predator (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33.   RQ-1 Predator UAV  
 
4. Ideal Doctrinal Requirements 
Doctrine must support a policy of bootstrapping and 
empowerment of the scene operators responsible for target 
prosecution.  That is the primary mission.  The data must 
be simple and feed directly to the operator.  There should 
be no middle-man utilizing the data to manage the 
operators.  The on-scene operators must have supreme 
control over their incoming data to produce the desired 
weapons effect. 
Mission modularity is key.  The On-Scene commander 
must be empowered to tailor the mission, equipment, and 
personnel in modular building blocks to the appropriate 




E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
A list of important considerations can be found in 
Appendix A. This section now provides MOE answers. Each MOE 
is listed first, followed by a listing of component parts 
and answers: 
1. Target Discrimination 
a. Equipment - Utilize Ultra Wideband (UWB) 
frequency patterns to recognize hostile 
equipment 
b. Location - Locate target with any sensor 
available, output a grid-coordinate layered 
with target data 
c. Stance - Requires a sensor to visual real-
time feed for screening by a human operator 
to discern hostile stance, layer in 
additional sensor data. 
d. Target discrimination data must be stored 
and correlated in a database in order to 
maintain target fidelity should the target 
move out of range of UWB sensors and into 
larger range passive sensors 
e. Suggested Equipment – IR/Near IR 
Sensors/Visual Sensors 
2. Grid Coordinates 
a. Visual, IR, Near IR, or even acoustic based 
sensors can passively acquire a set of 
targets.  In addition, active acoustic 
sensors could be utilized to locate targets.  
However, such sensors will need target 
discrimination data layered on top of the 
coordinate outputs.  The larger set of 
targets can be filtered with UWB active 
reflection data to discriminate hostile 
targets.  With positional data either from 
UWB device geospatial orientation, or a 
global positioning system (GPS) output 
meshed with range data to a device’s known 




3. Real-Time Visual Stream 
a. A real time visual stream can be produced 
from IR, Near IR, or even UWB Sensors.  
Real-time feeds from UWB type sensors have 
the added advantage of penetrating through 
opaque environments.  Again the output must 
be layered with Target Discriminating Data 
(TDD) for the operator interface.  Real time 
feeds can come from ground sensors, however 
the most effective sensor for maintaining a 
passive IR/Near IR/Visual feed is a mobile 
or static aerial sensor. 
4. Prioritization of Sensor Feeds 
a. Accomplished through autonomous software 
analysis of UWB TDD on such variables as 
hostile equipment, number of hostile 
targets, and high priority locations of 
targets.  In addition, manual input by 
operators of high priority targets 
prioritized by stance or otherwise should 
override autonomous settings.   
5. Queuing of Targets 
a. Process similar to Prioritization of sensor 
feeds.  Targets will be queued with layered 
UWB TDD in addition to operator overrides. 
6. Layered COP 
a. Layered COP will be generated through 
complete sensor fusion onsite within the 
payload of a persistent aerial sensor 
onboard a payload onboard a tethered static 
aerial sensor.  This portion of the system 
should be highly redundant as it is fault 
point.  Tethered Static Unmanned Aerial 
Nodes should be equipped with payloads 
capable of autonomous sensor fusion 
operations to support prioritization, 
queuing, and layering of data.  In addition 
these airborne fusion centers should be the 
centers for layering of sensor feeds to 
support the operator.  Finally, the payloads 
should also carry a backhaul transmission to 
a forward operating base (FOB), airborne 
platform, or other gateway outside of the 
local operating area. 
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7. Dissemination of Data 
a. Backhaul gateways will disseminate data 
beyond the sensor net.  The gateways will be 
contained onboard static aerial nodes.  
These static aerial nodes could either be a 
tethered balloon or a persistent airship.  
The payloads must be compatible with a 
number of different transmission mediums 
including but not limited to UHF, SATCOM, 
and Link-16 in order to deliver end products 
to weapons delivery systems such Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missiles or Attack Aircraft.  In 
addition, the common operating picture can 
be provided upwards to higher levels for 
dissemination to commanders for support 
operations. 
b. Within the sensor net, ground operators can 
interface directly with client devices.  
Transmission nodes will utilize UWB as the 
physical layer of communication for the 
transmission medium since it is the most 
secure and robust for operations in opaque 
environments. 
8. Ground Operator Interface 
a. Ground operators within the operating area 
should have access to the autonomously 
filtered TDD, prioritized sensor feeds for 
SA, and targeting solutions via a rendered 
common operational picture.  The interface 
will be wearable, possibly a heads up 
display (HUD) helmet (not unlike S.W.A.T. 
helmets or the HUD Helmet in development for 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) or a wearable 
device preferably on the forearm.  The 
device must utilize a full spectrum 
interface that can accept voice and keyed 
commands. All methods of end-user 
experimentation and survey should be 
utilized to find out the optimal method for 
the man-machine interface. The data 
deliverable to the ground operators within 
the sensor net will include (1) a COP in the 
form of a map with layered targets on top of 
it.  The TDD on each target should be hidden 
but accessible through the graphical user 
66 
interface (GUI) layers for the operator.  In 
addition, real-time sensor feeds should be 
available to the operator in a prioritized 
fashion with FOV selection. If there are 
airborne mobile sensors the operator should 
have access to control their FOV 
coordinates. 
9. Rapidly Deployable 
a. Airborne deployment of the system is 
necessary for sensor net operations. It is 
the only foreseeable solution to high tempo 
operations requiring a sensor net.  The 
sensor net should be deployed from an 
aircraft, or several aircraft.  The 
deployment design should conform to the 
terrain of operations.  For instance, if 
operating within triple canopy jungle UWB 
sensors should be deployed from aircraft via 
a parachute system that will entangle them 
and have them looking downward from the 
trees.  In other terrain sensors could 
utilize deployment not unlike that of the 
device used to sense surface environmental 
data for HALO drops (a device deployed from 
an aircraft that implants itself by a stake 
in the ground).  The UWB sensors should be 
deployed in a highly redundant fashion to 
ensure the fidelity of the net. UWB sensors 
should be deployed as the primary ground 
sensor and if they can be ruggedized 
sufficiently they should be deployed in a 
cluster fashion similar to that of the SFW.  
IR, Near IR, and Visual passive sensors will 
need to be onboard the payloads of static 
aerial devices since they provide also the 
majority of wide area coverage. UAV’s that 
mesh with the sensor net should be launched. 
10. Modularity 
a. System will have preset TDD prioritization 
algorithms for varying Rules of Engagement 
(ROE), varying deployment payloads, varying 





a. System will be interoperable with Link6, 
UHF/VHF/HF bands, satellite communications 
(SATCOM) and other transmission mediums 
required to make the precise passing of 
targeting data to shooters possible.  This 
capability will be deployed onboard the 
static aerial sensors to ensure fidelity and 
access. 
While the above provides MOE answers for the new 
system, it is important to add several important notes: 
• Static aerial nodes are required at varying 
altitudes for persistent aerial real-time feed 
coverage (recommend up to 4,500’). 
• Static aerial nodes are also required at varying 
altitudes for backhaul transmission and wide area 
transmission coverage/redundancy. This 
transmission system can also serve as a secure 
and reliable medium for audio communications. The 
operator only need transmit to the nearest 
transmission node and transmission will be 
relayed through the entire net. 
• TDD is required for discriminating Hostile Target 
Equipment. For example, in Baghdad, IED’s are a 
hostile equipment priority.  In Thailand large 
quantities of narcotic substances are the 
priority, and in the Philippines, Soviet made 
weaponry are the priority.  This of course, 
relies upon the final capabilities of UWB 
discrimination capabilities.  Prioritization 
tables of hostile equipment should be included in 
the AO modular package. This data helps for 
queuing and prioritization of targets. 
 
F. SYSTEM (MODEL) ARCHITECTURE 
The system architecture will be broken down areas as 
follows: 
1. Sensor Net Elements 
1.1. Real-Time Sensor Feeds (can be anything that 
produces a real-time feed) 
1.1.1. Aerial Feeds 
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1.1.1.1. Mobile Aerial Feeds 
1.1.1.1.1. Function: 
1.1.1.1.1.1. Flexible Aerial Coverage of Local 
Operating Area 
1.1.1.1.2. Example Equipment: 
1.1.1.1.2.1. RQ-11A Raven 
1.1.1.1.2.2. RQ-1 Predator 
1.1.1.1.2.3. RQ-4A Global Hawk 
1.1.1.2. Static Aerial Feeds 
1.1.1.2.1. Function: 
1.1.1.2.1.1. Persistent Coverage of Wide Area 
for area coverage a visual type passive 
sensor, real-time feed 
1.1.1.2.2. Example Equipment: 
1.1.1.2.2.1. Tethered Balloon Payload Aerial 
feed (Visual/IR/Near IR)  
1.1.2. Ground Feeds 
1.1.2.1. Static Ground Feeds 
1.1.2.1.1. Function: 
1.1.2.1.1.1. SA Augmentation with overlayed FOV 
and TDD 
1.1.2.1.2. Example Equipment: 
1.1.2.1.2.1. Ground Passive Visual, IR, or Near 
IR Camera feeds 
1.1.2.1.2.2. UWB Active Sensor Reflections 
transformed into Visual Sensor Feeds for 
environmental transparency 
1.1.2.2. Mobile Ground Feeds (Manned Sensor 
Feeds) 
1.1.2.2.1. Local Area Operator Sensor Feeds 
(Visual/IR/Near IR) 
1.1.2.2.1.1. Function: 
1.1.2.2.1.1.1. Flexible ground SA 
Augmentation with overlayed FOV and 
TDD 
1.1.2.2.1.2. Example Equipment: 




1.1.2.2.1.2.4. Wearable Sensor Feeds 
1.2. Threshold Sensors 
1.2.1. Functions: 
1.2.1.1. Provide Area Target Coverage and area 
prioritization 
1.2.1.2. Do not provide sensor feeds, they 
provide alerts when the threshold of passive 
emissions is detected for area prioritization 
1.2.2. Equipment Example: 
1.2.2.1. Static Aerial Payloads of 
Magnetic/Acoustic/IR/Near IR/Visual Sensors 
1.2.2.2. Static Ground Threshold Sensors of 
Magnetic/Acoustic/IR/Near IR/Visual Sensors 
similar to the Crossbow sensors utilized in the 
COASTS 2006 program 
1.3. Active Friendly Transmitters 
1.3.1. Functions: 
1.3.1.1. Transmit location data on friendly 
units to sensor fusion payloads to provide 
friendly SA 
2. Transmission Medium Elements – UWB Physical Layer 
2.1. Ground Nodes 
2.1.1. Mobile 
2.1.1.1. Functions: 
2.1.1.1.1. Provide a flexible SA and data 
gathering intelligence center if necessary 
2.1.1.1.2. C2 Functions 
2.1.1.1.3. Can serve the Gateway function for 
interoperability purposes 
2.1.1.1.4. UAV integration/operation 
2.1.1.2. Example Equipment: 
2.1.1.2.1. Network Operation Centers (NOC) 
similar to the Nemesis Van utilized in 
COASTS 2006 prototyping at Pt. Sur, Ft. Ord, 
and Camp Roberts 
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2.1.1.2.2. Man Portable Transmission Medium 
Nodes similar to the tactical communications 
Kit utilized in COASTS 2006 at Mae Gnat Dam 
2.1.2. Static 
2.1.2.1. Functions 
2.1.2.1.1. Serve as a reliable Physical Level 
layer for a transmission medium 
2.1.2.1.2. Provide communications security 
through frequency hopping 
2.1.2.2. Example Equipment: 
2.1.2.2.1. UWB Nodes (can double as sensors 
and transmission nodes) 
2.2. Aerial Nodes 
2.2.1. Mobile 
2.2.1.1. Functions 
2.2.1.1.1. Flexible Network Extenders  
2.2.1.2. Example Equipment 
2.2.1.2.1. Predator UAV’s acting as network 
extenders 
2.2.1.2.2. Rotomotion VTOL Miniature UAV’s 
ability to extend a 802.11 Network 
2.2.2. Static 
2.2.2.1. Functions: 
2.2.2.1.1. Wide Area Access Points for 
Network Integrity and Coverage 
2.2.2.1.2. Network Mesh Connectors to connect 
the topology where it can not be connected 
on the ground 
2.2.2.2. Example Equipment: 
2.2.2.2.1. Static Aerial Node Payload such as 
the balloons utilized in COASTS 2006 
2.2.2.2.2. Unmanned Air Ships that maintain a 
persistent presence 
2.3. Gateways 
2.3.1. Static Aerial Gateways 
2.3.1.1. Functions: 
2.3.1.2. Example Equipment 
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2.3.1.2.1. Payload onboard static aerial 
nodes (balloons) not unlike that utilized in 
COASTS 2006 at high altitudes for link 
integrity 
2.3.1.2.1.1. UHF Link 
2.3.1.2.1.2. VHF Link 
2.3.1.2.1.3. 802.20 Link 
2.3.1.2.1.4. 802.16 Link 
2.3.1.2.1.5. Link-16 Link 
2.3.1.2.1.6. SATCOM Link 





2.4.1.1.3. Database of Targets 
2.4.1.2. Common Picture Production 
2.4.1.2.1. Map Layering 
2.4.1.2.2. Target Layering 
2.4.1.2.3. Sensor Feed Layering 
2.4.1.2.4. TDD Layering 
2.4.1.3. Real-Time Sensor Feeds 
2.4.1.3.1. Prioritization 
2.4.1.3.2. Layering of TDD on top of Video 
Streams 
2.4.1.4. Example Equipment 
2.4.1.4.1. Custom designed Hardware and 
Software Payload of Static Aerial Nodes that 
acts like a server to fuse together 
information and provide it to end-users 
3. Rapid System Deployment Elements 
3.1. Cluster Deployment of Ground Sensors 
3.1.1. Functions: 
3.1.1.1. Modularity for deployment from a number 
platforms 
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3.1.1.2. Ability to create a redundant and 
robust deployment pattern for ground sensors 
3.1.2. Example Equipment: 
3.1.2.1. Deployed similar to the SFW 
3.1.2.2. Deployed out of the Back of a C-130 
similar to humanitarian rations 
3.2. Anchor Deployment of Gateways and Static Aerial 
Nodes 
3.2.1. Functions: 
3.2.1.1. Anchor the Static Aerial Nodes to the 
ground by a tether 
3.2.2. Example Equipment 
3.2.2.1. Modeled after the deployment of 
Sonobuoys coupled with the deployment of Jungle 
Penetrators (Anchors) 
3.2.2.2. Pushed out of the back of a C-130 
similar to that of humanitarian rations 
3.3. Organic/Outside Deployment of Mobile Aerial 
Nodes/Sensors 
3.3.1. Functions: 
3.3.1.1. Flexible Sensors that can be controlled 
and focused on high priority targets and areas 
3.3.1.2. Can serve as weapons action agents when 
armed 
3.3.2. Example Equipment: 
3.3.2.1. RQ-11A Raven UAV’s 
3.3.2.2. RQ-1 Predator 
3.3.2.3. RQ-4A Global Hawk 
4. End-User Interface Elements 
4.1. Functions: 
4.1.1. Provide common operational picture to the 
end-user consisting of a map and overlayed target 
data that can be viewed in layers 
4.1.2. Provide access to prioritized sensor feeds 
to the end-user 
4.1.3. Provide access to target data to the end-
user 
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4.1.4. Provide a common operational picture of 
fused sensor data for SA 
4.2. Example Equipment: 
4.2.1. Modular PC’s wearable PC’s 
4.2.2. Tacticomps 
4.2.3. The HUD Helmet in development for the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) which can overlay target 
data onto an individuals visual orientation of the 
scene 
4.2.4. Blue Force Tracker (BFT) 
 
G. AERIALLY DEPLOYED SENSOR NET 
1. Overview of the Model 
The system architecture for the sensor net will 
include a topology similar to that of the COASTS network or 
the Tactical Network Topology Program (TNT).  It will be 
deployed aerially for rapid employment in the area of 
operation utilizing the sensor in depth doctrine for 
integration into Joint Operations.  
The sensor in depth doctrine (Figure 34) will utilize 
multiple sensor layers from a strategic level providing 
global coverage (if necessary) to a tactical level.  The 
strategic level will leverage national intelligence assets 
to localize the AO. Intelligence assets include imagery 
intelligence (IMINT), HUMINT, Signals Intelligence 




Figure 34.   Sensor in Depth Layers 
 
Necessary intelligence will be passed down to the next 
level, the operational sensor layer, for further 
localization within the AO.  In addition, sensors will be 
deployed for passive patrolling of the AO to identify local 
operating areas containing possible targets of interest.  
Examples of patrolling elements at the operational level 
include RQ-1 Predator UAV’s, RQ-4 Globalhawks (see Figure 
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35), and HUMINT.  These localizers, once they identify an 
active target area, will pass the info downward for a 
closer look at the sensor net level. 
 
 
Figure 35.   RQ-4 Globalhawk ISR UAV Similar to the U-2 Spy 
Plane 
 
The operational layer acts to localize threats further 
and trigger the deployment of the real-time sensor net 
establishing the tactical sensor layer.  This will be a 
high tempo operation requiring real-time tactical targeting 
of targets within a pre-defined area passed down through 
the operational layer. 
After deployment, backhaul gateways should be 
established and tested as should the full functionality of 
the system.  Once fidelity and security is assured the 
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operation can discriminate, classify, and monitor targets 
in real-time. Standard doctrine will enable transmission of 
the targeting information to weapons action agents.  Also, 
it is important to mention that the sensor net should be 
highly redundant to ensure fidelity of the information and 
establish appropriate feeds. 
 
H. IMPLEMENTATION OF SENSOR NET 
COTS technology can be a big cost advantage to the 
real-time sensor net. Following is an itemized list of the 
technologies that could be utilized: 
• Cyber Defense Systems CyberBUG mini-UAV Drone 
• Lightweight surveillance, reconnaissance, 
target acquisition 
• Rotomotion SR20 Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
(VTOL) UAV Helicopter System 
• Surveillance, reconnaissance, target 
acquisition, network extension, sensor 
deployment 
• Crossbow Wireless Ad-hoc Sensor Network 
• Infrared and magnetic anomaly sensors for 
security and tracking 
• CACI/Cisco Tactical Communications Kit (TCK) 
• Ruggedized rapidly-deployable, secure voice, 
data, and video communications open-standard 
Internet Protocol router, interfaces Cisco 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), 
wireless, satellite, and land mobile radio 
(LMR) connectivity (LMRoIP) 
• Harris AN/PRC-117 ground-to-air havequick I/II 
radio system 
• HF/VHF/UHF (30-512 MHz) reprogrammable 
digital radio 
• Harris AN/PRC-150 man pack radio system 
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• NSA certified HF/VHF radio for secure voice 
and data (9600 bps) communication up to 60 
MHz 
• SecNet 11 National Security Agency (NSA) 
Certified 802.11 Encryption 
• XACTA Deployable Wireless Mesh Nodes  
• Tachyon tactical SATCOM equipment 
• Integrated Blimp Works’ 10’/13’ Ball Balloons and 
My-te Winch Hoists 
• Equipped with MeshDynamics Network Devices 
and Antennas to act as network extenders at 
4,500 feet 
• IEEE 802.11. 802.16, and 802.20 wireless 
protocols 
• MeshDynamic Systems (MDS) 802.16/11 Boxes 
• A Mobile Network Operations Center (MNOC) titled 
“Nemesis” 
• Two way radio integration of Land Mobile Radio 
over IP (LMRoIP), ARC over IP (ARCoIP), 
SATCOMoIP, and Voice over (VoIP) for backhaul 
gateways 
• MDS DenyGPS 
The suggested sensor net could easily to jammed by a 
national level force’s technology (i.e. China or Iran). 
However, this system is designed for decomposed forces that 
will most likely not have the capability to jam or even 
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V. SYSTEM SOLUTION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this investigative study was to suggest 
a model for a system of systems which improves real-time 
targeting through an aerially deployed wireless mesh sensor 
network. 
 
A. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Path to a Solution 
The path to a solution is multifaceted and multi-
tasked. Paths to a proven concept should thus include the 
following components: 
• Experimentation for Development of MOP’s 
• Additional Survey for Development of MOP’s 
• LLNL Guardian Sensors 
• In depth research by established foundation 
SPAWAR 
• Survey, ruggedized, and reliable COTS equipment 
Prioritization algorithms need to be developed, given 
the input of TDD and coordinates and high value asset 
coordinates. These algorithms should be modular and 
flexible to the requirements of the AO (geographical, 
political, current forces in the area, threat intelligence, 
threat priorities (i.e. if they’re carrying drugs, rifles, 
or IEDs). 
The path to a solution also requires network 
development and gateway integration.  Transmission medium 
must be developed to be robust, secure, and self healing. 
Gateway interoperability must be developed for the aerial 
payloads.  Interoperability with SATCOM, UHF, Link-16, and 
even 802.20 must be utilized. 
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Common operational picture interface also need be 
developed for a heavily layered simplistic interface.  The 
interface should take full use of input commands from human 
operators including acoustic, conventional tactile, and 
even motion patterning input methods.   Output will require 
refinement to create a seemless information flow to the 
operator in the least restrictive manner possible utilizing 
a head mounted HUD or wearable PC. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Ruggedized MTM Micro Tablet by Modular PC 
(From: http://modular-pc.com/, Retrieved March 
2, 2006) 
 
In addition, the path to a solution requires a number 
of other tasks and activities. These have been summarized 
and presented in list form as follows: 
• LLNL Guardian Sensors for the foundation of the 
sensor net to produce layers. 
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• Integration of UAV’s — RQ-11 Raven, RQ-1 
Predator, RQ-4 Global Hawk links into static 
aerial sensor fusion center. 
• Sensor fusion payloads which accept multiple 
inputs from different layers. 
• A static aerial node deployment method, not 
unlike the canopy penetrators utilized in 
Vietnam, but with balloons that inflate quickly. 
• Integration of already existing IR and near IR 
sensors. 
• Static ground sensors deployed as a cluster 
munitions like the SFW. 
• Man-portable mobile ground real-time sensor feeds 
for flexible first person operator views. 
• Modular systems for urban ops, jungle ops, 
mountain ops, and desert ops; all built from 
common modules. 
• UWB analyses for ability penetration of opaque 
environments. 
• Long life power supplies of all equipment 
(gridpoint renewable power sources). 
• Airborne Sensor Fusion Centers for TDD layering 
technology. For example, the London subways use 
of UWB sensors to layer target data onto a real-
time visual feed literally drawing a box around a 
weapon a person is carrying. 
• Integrate GPS systems into all sensor nodes for 
positional layering purposes and FOV calculation 
in addition to outputting accurate grid 
coordinates to weapons. 
• Efficient GUI interface for the common 
operational picture. The interface should be 
developed in a layered system displaying top 
level data that can be drilled downwards and 
access feeds. 
The path to a solution also involves doctrine 
development.  It is important to categorize hostile stance 
imagery from real-time sensor feeds and integration into 
training doctrine for TDD rules of engagement (ROE).  That 
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is, what TDD weapon kill and answer the question as to how 
much sensor data is required to initiate weapon action on a 
target.  There is also a need to experiment with optimal 
aerial deployment pattern for the Sensor Net (not unlike 
the deployment patterns for sonobuoy sub hunting) 
Interface doctrine must also be created.  It should be 
determined as to who is allowed to control the focus of 
limited real-time sensor feed assets and how many sensor 
interface units are required by local area operators within 
the net.  In addition, it is important to develop doctrine 
for utilization of real-time sensor feeds and determine 
when to monitor them, what information is required, and how 
reliable are they. 
 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should focus on a survey of. Such a 
survey should include SOF, Airborne Attack Craft, Attack 
UAV’s, and target prosecuting forces. 
Future research should also focus on test beds and 
delivering products to the end user.  It is important to 
work closer with end-users to identify essential products 
and simplify needs. 
In addition, future research should experiment with 
the ability/use of ground sensor feeds. Such research 
should try to answer the questions, “Are they feasible?” 
“Does a pattern of randomly spread real-time sensor feeds 
assist in SA?” 
It is also important to research the interoperability 
links of the RQ-4A Global Hawk, the RQ-11A Raven, and the 
RQ-1 Predator. What links will be required on the Gateway 
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Payload to link to these organic and outside assets? This 
was an issue when linking the Cyberbug UAV and the 
Rotomotion UAV into the COASTS 2006 network. Since links 
were in different formats, the UAVs lacked 
interoperability. 
The following specific research studies need to be 
performed: 
1. A research study on the prioritization/queuing of 
TDD should be performed.  How should 
targets/local operating areas be optimally 
prioritized by algorithms? How will this vary in 
varying AO’s, urban vs. triple canopy jungle, 
political insurgencies vs. genocide? 
2. Research the network layers.  To determine what 
it can support, how it can integrate with sensor 
feeds and when overload occurs. 
3. Examine feasibility of uplinking data to an 
aerial attack craft and seeing how much SA could 
be provided. 
4. Investigate the feasibility of a common 
operational picture being inserted into an 
aircraft.  Such a study should ask, how can this 
be accomplished?  Will that be useful?  How much 
targeting can be achieved with it?  Can airborne 
attack assets control their own weapons release 
and identify targets with the interface link from 
the common operational picture?  To whom other 
than on scene operators will the common 
operational picture be disseminated? 
5. Research security protocol during real time 
operations for an UWB physical layer (Secnet.11 
NSA certified security encryption for 802.11 
already exists, so it is feasible to apply to UWB 
communications).  In addition, natural security 
features of UWB frequency hopping should be 
investigated. 
6. Research altitude requirements for the 
transmission medium payload of the static aerial 
nodes (balloons).  Finally, the pattern of 
graduated heights should be investigated to  
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determine a lower layer of sensor net coverage 
and an upper layer of sensor fusion centers with 
gateway backhauls. 
7. Research gateway nodes to determine how they 
should be linked - what SATCOM links, with 
forward operating bases, with intelligence 
centers?  What kind of doctrine should be 
developed for the gateway nodes?  To whom should 
they report? 
8. How should data be classified coming from the 
Sensor Net if it can be made available to a wider 
military community via the gateways.  What 
doctrine could be developed for the control of 
the data dissemination? 
9. Future research should determine whether local 
area operators utilizing the transmission medium 
and the targeting net can to release weaponry 
onto targets. 
The solution exists in the potential technological-
doctrinal capabilities of our society to overcome current 
targeting discrepancies and meet the asymmetric threat of 
ideological hatred faced in opaque environments globally 
through an aerially deployed, real-time targeting, sensor 
net. 
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APPENDIX A.  ACRONYMS 
AO Area of Operations 
AOR Area of Responsibility 
ATO Air Tasking Order 
 
BFT Blue Force Tracker 
 
C2 Command and Control 
CA Civil Affairs 
CBT Combating Terrorism 
COASTS Coalition Operating Assisted Surveillance 
and Targeting System 
COCOM  Combatant Commander 
COIN   Counter Insurgency 
COP Common Operational Picture 
COTS   Commercial off The Shelf 
 
DA Direct Action 
DoD Department of Defense 
DSS Distributed Spread Spectrum 
 
FID Foreign Internal Defense 
FLAK Fly Away Kit 
 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GWOT Global War on Terrorism 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
 
HAHO High Altitude High Opening 
HALO High Altitude Low Opening 
HF High Frequency 
HN Host Nation 
HUD Heads up Display 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IO Information Operations 
IP Internet Protocol 
IR Infrared 






JC4ISR Joint Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance 
JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force West 
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force 
 
LAN   Local Area Network 
LLNL   Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
LPI Low Probability of Intercept 
 
MGRS Military Grid Reference System 
MNOC Mobile Network Operations Center 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
MOOTW  Military Operations Other Than War 
MOP Measures of Performance 
 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Association 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NPSSOCFEP Naval Postgraduate School Special Operations 
Field Experimentation Program 
 
OE Opaque Environment 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
 
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RTA Royal Thai Army 
RTAF Royal Thai Air Force 
 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SFW Sensor Fuzed Weapon 
SOF   Special Operations Force 
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System 
 
TDG   Technological-Doctrinal Gap 
TNT Tactical Network Topology 
TOC Tactical Operations Center 




UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UWB   Ultra Wideband 
 
VBSS Visit Board Search and Seizure 
VTOL   Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
VHF Very High Frequency 
 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
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APPENDIX B.  MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Deliver target discrimination data between 
targets and non-combatants utilizing hostile 
equipment on the target and coordinates of the 
target(s) 
 
2. Deliver Highly Accurate Grid Coordinates layered 
with target discrimination data. Data should be 
filtered out for modularity purposes. 
 
3. Provide a real-time visual (visual, IR, near IR, 
or UWB produced) sensor feed on the target 
layered with target discrimination data, FOV 
data. 
 
4. Prioritize multiple real-time sensor feeds by 
target discrimination data and number of targets 
autonomously. 
 
5. Multiple targets must be queued up in order of 
priority based upon target data autonomously. 
 
6. Generate a layered common operational picture of 
all targets by fusing all sensor data together. 
 
7. From the common operational picture allow portal 
type access to layered real-time sensor feeds, 
and layered individual target data. 
 
8. Disseminate the common operational picture beyond 
the tactical force for Joint Operations 
empowerment and force situational awareness. 
 
9. Sensor operations and data filtering should be in 
complete control of the on scene operator(s). 
 
10. The system must be rapidly deployable within the 
time frame of a half an hour. 
 
11. Operators must have direct interface with data 




12. The system must be modular, allowing for a 
variety of preplanned and ad-hoc environmental 
variances. 
 
13. Above all the system goal must be to bootstrap 




APPENDIX C.  COALITION OPERATING AREA SURVEILLANCE 
AND TARGETING SYSTEM (COASTS) THAILAND FIELD 
EXPERIMENT (MAY 2006) 
In FY2006 the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) carried 
out a research program entitled the Coalition Operating 
Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS). The COASTS 
field experimentation program supports U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), 
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), NPS, Royal Thai 
Armed Forces (RTARF), and the Thai Department of Research & 
Development Office (DRDO) science and technology research 
requirements relating to theater and national security, 
counter-drug and law enforcement missions, and the War On 
Terror (WOT). This CONOPS is primarily intended for use by 
the NPS and RTARF management teams as well as by 
participating commercial partners. However, it may be 
provided to other U.S. Government (USG) organizations as 
applicable. This document describes research and 
development aspects of the COASTS program and establishes a 
proposed timetable for a cap-stone demonstration during May 
2006 in Thailand.  
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The COASTS programmatic concept is modeled after a 
very successful ongoing NPS-driven field experimentation 
program entitled the NPS-U.S. Special Operations Command 
Field Experimentation Program (NPSSOCFEP). NPSSOCFEP is 
executed by NPS, in cooperation with USSOCOM and several 
contractors, and has been active since FY2002. Program 
inception supported USSOCOM requirements for integrating 
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emerging wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies 
with surveillance and targeting hardware/software systems 
to augment Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. 
NPSSOCFEP has grown significantly since inauguration to 
include 10-12 private sector companies who continue to 
demonstrate their hardware/software capabilities, several 
DoD organizations (led by NPS) who provide operational and 
tactical surveillance and targeting requirements, as well 
as other academic institutions and universities who 
contribute a variety of resources.  
NPSSOCFEP conducts quarterly 1-2 week long complex 
experiments comprising 8-10 NPS faculty members, 20-30 NPS 
students, and representatives from multiple private 
companies, DoD and US government agencies. Major objectives 
are as follows: 
• Provide an opportunity for NPS students and 
faculty to experiment/evaluate with the latest 
technologies which have potential near-term 
application to the warfighter.  
• Leverage operational experience of NPS students 
and faculty  
• Provide military, national laboratories, 
contractors, and civilian universities an 
opportunity to test and evaluate new technologies 
in operational environments  
• Utilize small, focused field experiments with 
well-defined measures of performance for both the 
technologies and the operator using the 
technologies  
• Implement self-forming / self-healing, multi-
path, ad-hoc network w/sensor cell, ground, air, 
and satellite communications (SATCOM) network 
components  
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